ABSTRACT This paper discusses two modeling and simulation (M&S) issues for defense cyber-physical systems (CPSs): 1) model-driven development via model interoperation and 2) simulation analysis between interoperated models. To clearly describe the network capabilities between the CPSs within network-centric warfare (NCW), we first modeled communication factors separately from the overall CPSs. The CPS models and the network model were considered discrete event systems, which were realized with DEVSim++ and ns-3, respectively. For the simulation of the two types of models, we interoperated them with high-level architecture-based middleware to preserve the independence of each one. The goal for NCW analysis is to find a balance between the computational, physical, and communication factors of the defense CPSs to achieve their missions within a networked environment. In the case study of network-centric ground warfare, the CPS models generate mission effectiveness to be analyzed according to realistic network conditions; and at the same time, the network model enables the analysis of the network performance given validated combat scenarios. We expect this paper will help simulation experts interactively analyze computational and physical capabilities of the CPSs as well as communication effects between the CPSs.
I. INTRODUCTION
A cyber-physical system (CPS) is an engineered system to be built from the synergy of computational and physical subsystems [1] . An autonomous unmanned vehicle, for a typical example of the CPS, decides with proper computations and it dynamically behaves according to the decision [2] , [3] . For large-scale CPSs, communications between the CPSs as well as their inner subsystems should be evaluated, which results in networked CPSs [4] , [5] . A wireless sensor network or mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) is used for information acquisition between the networked CPSs [6] , [7] .
In the military field, combat entities such as weapons, vehicles, or vessels are regarded as CPSs because they are physical objects with computational capabilities [8] , [9] . Network-centric warfare (NCW) links many combat objects
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Mengchu Zhou. so that the corresponding forces receive information superiority and demonstrate a better situational awareness of the battlespace [10] - [12] . Hence, the NCW is seen as networked CPSs containing large-scale CPSs and a communication system for them [13] . For example, the military CPSs in the NCW are linked via a network architecture and carry out tactical operations regarding understanding situational awareness, making tactical decisions, and developing a course of action. For this reason, the NCW has been studied in terms of networked CPSs to evaluate a timely and robust informationsharing mission achievement [14] , [15] .
NCW analysis lies in the organic integration of multiple domains, i.e., the CPSs in the cyber-physical area and their communications in the information domain [16] . To this end, this study uses modeling and simulation (M&S) techniques, which have been widely utilized for designing and analyzing complex CPSs [17] , [18] . Studying CPS models gives us insight into how they will behave in the real world [19] . We can experimentally analyze the operational and functional capabilities of the CPSs and experience how they are vulnerable to cyber attacks [20] .
During the past decades, several defense CPS models have been proposed for NCW analysis. It is observed that most of them need two improvements regarding modeling and analysis aspects. For example, some studies have developed their models with an integrated approach rather than a system of system (SoS) approach. Such an enormous performance penalty prevents their usage on simulating CPSs of practical scale. Also, others had shortcomings for their methods or simulation results. They did not explain how operational scenarios and communication effects are affected interactively based on empirical simulation results.
This study presents model-driven development and analysis for the NCW with two motivated aspects: model interoperation and complementary analysis. As illustrated in Figure 1 , we partition an overall NCW system into two independent models: a computer-generated force (CGF) model and a network model. Then the two models are interoperated by sustaining high modularity and localization [21] , [22] . In specific, the CGF model focuses on constructive force-on-force simulation, which describes the outward appearances of military CPSs such as physical and computational activities [23] . The network model accounts for the deployment of the CPSs. It takes charge of transferring information between them considering communication effects such as transmission delay and data loss [24] .
Another advantage of model interoperation resides in its complementary analysis. In other words, model interoperation allows a simulation analyst to design and execute overall simulation independently, which makes it possible to analyze individual simulations separately and interactively [8] . For example, the CGF model would compute mission effectiveness (y CGF in Figure 1 ) with realistic communication effects (v N ) accounted for by the network model. Similarly, the network model would measure network performance (y N ) according to a validated military scenario (v CGF ) generated by the CGF model.
Because the developed models have different system taxonomies and unique characteristics, suitable simulation tools are required for model implementation or simulator development. In this study, the CGF model is realized with DEVSim++ [25] . It is an M&S tool based on the semantics of the discrete event systems specification (DEVS) formalism [26] . The network model is implemented using ns-3, which is an object-oriented simulator for communication networks [27] . For interoperable simulation, high-level architecture (HLA) has been widely used to interact with distributed heterogeneous simulators [28] ; thus, we use HLA-based middleware for interoperable simulation between the CGF and the network simulators.
As a case study, we applied the proposed M&S development to network-centric ground warfare. In this application, mission effectiveness for the CGF simulator and network performance for the network simulator were analyzed on two levels. First, we macroscopically analyzed simulation results by changing all variables and parameters of the two simulators. Then we focused on specific experimental points of each simulator as minimizing the influences of the other simulator. Linear regression models were built to analyze computational and physical capabilities from the CGF simulator as well as communication effects from the network simulator. We expect that this study will provide support for M&S activities for networked CPSs.
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our motivation, and Section 3 introduces related works and compares them. Section 4 proposes our M&S development for the networked CPSs. Section 5 explains and discusses an application for NCW analysis. Finally, Section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
II. MOTIVATION
This section clarifies our motivation regarding two perspectives: modeling and analysis aspects.
A. MODELING ASPECT: SYSTEM VERSUS SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
As explained in the introduction, combat objects in NCW are considered CPSs because they perform physical activities based on computational procedures. This study classifies the NCW system, or the networked CPSs, into a CGF system including the defense CPSs and their communication system. In the defense field, it is a type of command, control, and communication (C3) system. Figure 2 illustrates two modeling methods for merging the two systems. The first approach is a conventional method in which a modeler views the system as a whole singular system. M I in Figure 2 is the integrated model containing CGF and network models, which jointly share common information in an integrated form. On the other hand, in the case of M II as the second approach, the modeler views the system as an SoS that is operationally and manageably independent between subsystems [29] , [30] .
The main difference between the two modeling methods is the number of independent models: The integrated system features only one model, whereas the SoS features two or more models. The interoperation method facilitates each model in carrying out its tasks autonomously and independently [21] . Such independence allows the modeler to modify one model locally with all the other models left unchanged. Flexible modification enables evolutionary system development, which is a distinguishing characteristic of SoS development [31] .
Also, independent models could be realized with a separate implementation framework to support their specifications. Because each model has a different system taxonomy or characteristic, the modeler should develop it with an appropriate simulation tool [21] , [32] . This local modification and separate implementation would be a necessary condition for complementary analysis, which is explained in the following subsection.
B. ANALYSIS ASPECT: SINGLE ANALYSIS VERSUS COMPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS
The goal for NCW analysis is to find a balance between military factors to maximize the mission success rate of a friendly force within a networked environment [8] . In specific, the NCW analysis needs to analyze two indices of interest: mission effectiveness for the CGF model and network performance for the network model. Figure 3 shows two analytic views for the NCW system: single analysis via integrated simulation and complementary analysis based on interoperable simulation. In the single analysis, indices of interest, which are either mission effectiveness or network performance, are influenced by a combination of CPSs' operations and network conditions all at once. Because all parameters and variables, i.e., p CPS , v CPS , p N , and v N , are dependable and mixed in the integrated model, it is difficult to classify, design, and find the factors that strongly influence the index.
On the contrary, complementary analysis enables the analysis of indices of interest in an independent manner based on two or more simulations. In Figure 3 , indices for the complementary analysis are partitioned into two simulations, i.e., y CGF of M CGF simulation and y N of M N simulation. Note that the independent analysis of y CGF and y N does not imply that their results are entirely isolated. Instead, these two results are affected by both interoperated models in an interactive manner. For example, y CGF is influenced by not only the results of the M CGF but also the variables and parameters in the M N ; and y N is also affected by both variables and parameters in the M CGF and results of the M N . Thus, the experimental design of the complementary analysis is much more flexible when changing variables and parameters belonging to each independent model. 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
For the past decades, several defense CPS models have been researched for NCW analysis. Table 1 summarizes their characteristics concerning the two motivations in our study, i.e., modeling and analysis aspects. The collective contribution of these studies is that they developed meaningful simulation systems in the military domain. Moreover, all the studies concentrated on constructive simulation for networkcentric analysis. Because the network model is the most critical part of NCW simulation, the studies prominently featured physics-based network modeling at an engineeringlevel simulation.
Despite these contributions, these studies still warrant some improvements. From the modeling perspective, some studies developed their CPS models with an integrated approach rather than an SoS-based approach [33] - [36] . In other words, authors in these studies proposed a unified M&S framework to support network abilities and mission operations. Although their models are suitable for a centralized simulation environment, some weaknesses are inevitable, e.g., flexible modification of component models, separate model implementation, independent experimental design, and complementary analysis, those of which are described in the previous section.
Several researchers have studied SoS-based modeling, which is similar to our approach. For example, in Cayirci and Ersoy's work [37] , military operational data were unilaterally delivered to a communication model for performance analysis of the communication system. Because of one-way transmission from operational to communication simulations, they could not analyze the mission effectiveness of the defense CPSs given the communication effects. On the other hand, Paz and Baer [38] combined a CGF and a communication simulator, which are HLA compliant for interoperable simulation. The roles of independent models in this study are nearly identical to our modeling roles.
Nevertheless, from an analytical point of view, most studies including Paz and Baer's research did not provide sufficient methods or empirical results for complementary analysis. One of their goals was NCW analysis; however, they mostly focused on how to model network systems and implement them. For example, Miner et al. [36] only provided a single analysis for tactical communication simulation in the integrated environment. Furthermore, although Paz and Baer [38] dealt with the NCW simulation from the perspective of SoS, they only expressed the interface between two simulations without experimental analysis. Most studies did not explain how operational scenarios and communication effects are affected interactively based on empirical simulation results.
To summarize, previous studies suffer from either inefficient M&S methods or insufficient simulation analysis despite satisfactory software development. They generally focused on specific parts between physical, computational, and communication systems. Because the NCW requires a balanced analysis between the three elements, the CPS concept will help the researchers to consider all the elements in an interactive and integrated manner. In this situation, the focus of this study is to make the best use of M&S for networked CPSs, to overcome these disadvantages, and to produce empirical simulation results.
IV. PROPOSED WORK
In this section, we describe the proposed M&S for networked CPSs. Overall M&S development, the design of two independent models, and model interoperation are explained here.
A. OVERALL M&S DEVELOPMENT
In conventional combat modeling, military CPSs have assumed sufficient communication between them. For example, some studies have considered the perfect delivery of information between combat models [39] , [40] ; others have used a simple connection probability to determine whether a transmission is successful [41] , [42] . However, in reality, communication is based on radio transmission along lineof-sight paths or multipath propagation effects [43] . If the communication fails, detection information or orders are not shared normally, which may lead to severe mission failure. Therefore, M&S for NCW should consider realistic communication effects between the military CPSs as well as their operations and behaviors. Figure 4 shows the overall M&S development for NCW analysis, which is classified into three phases. First, a CGF model (I in Figure 4 ) mainly contains CPS models to describe CPSs that participate in NCW. The CPS models fundamentally forward external messages to a communication agent (CA) model, and the CA model routes them to destination models if possible. For the communication system, the network model (I ) covers network nodes according to the network topology. The nodes can be dynamically removed, added, or substituted by interacting with the relevant CGF model. As explained in the introduction, the CGF model is specified by the DEVS formalism, and the network model is described as the MANET.
Next, the decomposed models are realized with suitable M&S tools (II). For example, DEVS models can be implemented by utilizing an implementation framework supporting the DEVS formalism, such as DEVSimHLA [25] , DEVSML [44] , or CD++ [45] . The network model also has several commercial simulation tools to reflect realistic communication effects between the nodes. This separation of model design and implementation is a practical advantage of our SoS approach.
Finally, two simulators to be developed are interoperated based on a standardized ambassador or architecture (III). HLA, test and training enabling architecture (TENA), or service-oriented architecture (SOA) is a solution for model interoperation. In this study, we use a runtime infrastructure (RTI), which is software that supports the HLA [46] .
B. CGF MODEL DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
The DEVS formalism, which is a set-theoretic specification of discrete event systems, consists of atomic and coupled models [26] . The formalism is highly compatible with military systems organized hierarchically in a one-to-one manner. For example, a coupled model structurally guarantees modularity between component models through input/output (I/O) relations. An atomic model provides behavioral semantics, which is useful for expressing computational and physical activities. For these reasons, the formalism has been widely used for combat modeling [11] , [47] , [48] . Because DEVS models can be transformed into graph diagrams, we provide DEVS diagrams in Figures 5 and 7 [49] . Figure 5 illustrates a DEVS-coupled diagram for CGF modeling, whose DEVS notations are represented at the end of the figure. Fundamentally, the CGF model consists of several types of components models, that are either atomic or coupled models, and their connections. Inside the model, the CA model is connected with every CPS model according to two pairs of IC (Internal Coupling) relations: (to_CA of the CPS models, from_CPS of the CA model) and (to_CPS of the CA model, from_CA of the CPS models). Externally, two types of relations, i.e., the EIC (External Internal Coupling) and EOC (External Output Coupling), are used to link between the outside and the inner CA model. • EIC = {(CGF.from_Net, CA.from_Net);
• EOC = {(CA.to_Net, CGF.to_Net);
Similar to the CGF model, the CPS model is hierarchically structured with two sub-models, i.e., command and control (C2) atomic models and combat unit (CU) coupled models. The following notations represent the CPS and CU coupled models. The C2 model takes charge of military computational tasks, e.g., understanding of situational awareness, making tactical decisions, and developing courses of actions. The CU model, which includes actuator and sensor sub-models hierarchically, represents an outward form with physical effects. Note that indecomposable sub-models in a CPS model, i.e., C2, Actuator, and Sensor, have no direct connections between them, which means that the CPS and CU coupled models have no IC relations. The indirect connections are related to behaviors of the CA model, which will be explained with the CA model. 
(CU .from_CA, Actuator.from_CA)};
• EOC = {(Sensor.to_CA, CU .to_CA), (Actuator.to_CA, CU .to_CA)};
• IC = ∅;
• Sel ({Sensor, Actuator}) = Sensor. According to the type and resolution of the CPS model, it can contain multiple C2 or CU models. For example, if a CPS model expresses an aircraft as a single unit with low resolution, it is enough to design single C2 and CU models in the CPS model. On the other hand, if a CPS model represents a higher object to aggregate the units such as a company with ten tanks, a modeler can build several CU models for each tank within the CPS model. Finally, although a CPS model is unit level, if it has a high resolution, several CU or C2 models could be required to express the complexity of the model.
As well as the structure, the type and resolution of the CPS model also influence behaviors of the C2 and CU models. Figure 6 illustrates the computational process of the C2 model that is included in the top-layer CPS model. Based on threat reports from CU models in the same CPS model or other lower-layer CPS models, it fundamentally conducts the following C2 actions sequentially: 1) information fusion (IF), 2) threat evaluation (TE), and 3) weapon assignment (WA). After accomplishing these actions, the model determines whether to handle it internally or externally, i.e., whether to send the decision (the C2 order) to neighbor CU models or other CPS models. This computational process is recursively conducted until no targets are reported. Blocks with bold lines and fonts in Figure 6 denote I/O relations for the C2 model. 
Next, the CU-coupled model has two types of DEVS atomic models: a sensor and an actuator model. Sensor Radar , as specified below, is an example of the search radar model. First, it has one operational state, i.e., DETECT, and one standby state, i.e., WAIT. The model is fundamentally activated and deactivated via an order received from a relevant C2 model. After receiving the order at the WAIT state initially, it changes to the DETECT state and detects threats during every t DETECT . If threats are identified, the model sends the detection information as an output. Among detailed algorithms of Sensor Top , addThreat() stores inputs regarding threat information, refreshDetectTime() updates t DETECT when the model receives an input in the DETECT state, and detectThreat()calculates the actual threats among the stored ones. According to the sensor type, these algorithms are diversely developed.
The actuator model carries out specific physical behaviors such as launching an attack or maneuvering tactically. Similar to Sensor Radar , Actuator Maneuver , as an example of a propulsion system, has one operational state and one initial state. This model also maneuvers according to a received order and sends the maneuvering result outside. The output, i.e., to_CA, has two data: 1) updated position whenever it moves every t Move and 2) accomplishment of the C2 order. The detailed maneuvering action is described in updatePosition(). It is noted that the C2 Top , Sensor Radar , and Actuator Maneuver explained here are examples of the C2 and CU models. Likewise, DEVS-based modeling provides a complete and clear semantics of an object to be modeled, thus reducing the effort required to read and understand it [47] . 
In the introduction, we explained that CPSs are distant. It is true that most components within the same CPS are also apart from one another. For example, an antiballistic missile system is generally comprised of a radar system and interceptor launchers, which are physically distributed to retain a safe separation distance. From a modeling view, this means that CPS models and their component models are not directly connected.
In this case, the CA model is in charge of the following roles. It provides an indirect path for transferring messages between all CU and C2 models, e.g., orders from the C2 models and reports from the CU models. To exchange the messages through a communication network, the CA model interacts with the network model. In the network model, the messages are processed by being divided into two types: positional and traffic information. Thus, the CA model utilizes two mapping functions, i.e., getNodeInformation() and getTrafficInformation(), to convert the messages from the CPS models into interpreted forms in the network model.
The following specifications represent DEVS modeling of the CA model. It contains five states, which are classified into three groups: 1) WAIT for the model's standby, 2) SEND_MOB_NET for sending positional, i.e., mobility information from the CPS to the network model, and 3) SEND_TRF_NET, SEND_TRF_CPS, RESEND, and LOSS for exchanging traffic information between the two models. The positional information is transmitted in only one direction. When the CA model receives an updated location of the CPS model, the model immediately converts and forwards it to the network model and does not wait for any response.
On the contrary, traffic information is a two-way transmission. For example, we assume that the CA model in the WAIT state receives an order message from a C2 model, i.e., a source model. In this case, the CA model transforms the message into a traffic and delivers it to the network model at the SEND_TRF_NETstate. Then it waits for the traffic result from the network model. Because a damage or a loss for the traffic can occur in the communication network, the two states, i.e., RESEND and LOSS, are necessary for deciding its retransmission or loss. If the CA model receives the result from the network model normally, it converts the input into the original order and forwards it to the destination model in the CPS model through the SEND_TRF_CPS state.
SEND_TRF_CPS, RESEND, LOSS; 
to_Net) and execute getNodeInformation(), (SEND_TRF_NET ) → (to_Net) and execute getNodeInformation() and getTrafficInformation(), (SEND_TRF_CPS) → (to_CPS) and execute getNodeInformation() and getTrafficInformation();
• ta :
Among the specific actions in this CA modeling, getNodeInformation() manages how the component models in the CPS model are mapped into distinct nodes in the network model. By performing this action, the CA model only sends the node identification (ID) instead of the component model itself for updating its position. Similarly, getTrafficInformation() maps the messages regarding orders and reports in the CPS model into network traffic with distinguishable IDs. These two actions are executed in the output functions.
One of the main advantages of developing DEVS models is the separation of modeling and its implementation. Among various DEVS-based M&S tools, we chose DEVSimHLA, which is a toolset that supports the development of HLA-compliant simulators based on the DEVS semantics [40] . The toolset consists mainly of two groups: one for standalone model realization and the other for model interoperation via HLA/RTI. The former group is represented by DEVSim++, which is a simulation engine for DEVS models. The next group for model interoperation includes the smart adaptor referred to as the KHLAAdaptor, which enables M&S developers to join any HLA-compliant simulator easily. In this study, we implemented the CGF model using DEVSim++; we used the KHLAAdaptor for interoperable simulation, which will be explained in the following subsection.
C. NETWORK MODEL DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
The objective of network modeling is to reflect realistic communication effects for the CGF model. In this regard, the network model receives two types of messages from the CA model in the CGF model.
First, the network model receives positional messages of component models in the CPS models. As the component models move, according to the messages, the network model also updates the locations of communication nodes and dynamically revises the configuration of the nodes. Next, it receives operational messages, e.g., orders and reports described in Section 4.B, which are interacted between the CPS component models. When the network model receives the messages, it finds available routing paths, computes the communication effects of the paths such as communication delay and data loss, and sends the messages concerning computation to the CGF model. The second type of messages is regarded as communication traffic in the network model.
For network M&S, we used ns-3, which is a discreteevent network simulator based on object-oriented modeling. It contains a set of libraries to support various models and is compatible with other external libraries; thus, a modeler can easily modify his/her models in the open-source environment [50] . Because the MANET, our targeted network, is a collection of mobile nodes, it dynamically forms temporary links in the ns-3 simulator. When the state of a link changes from reliable to unreliable, one of the end nodes in this link will be newly selected as an active node. Thus, the MANET suffers from frequent link changes and failures, which in turn influence measures of mission effectiveness in military applications. Figure 8 shows network M&S using the ns-3. Fundamentally, a node model in the network model is mapped into a component model with communication equipment in the CGF model. All the node models are interconnected to a channel model for the network packet flow. The node model has three hierarchical sub-models, i.e., net device, protocol stack, and application. The net device model transfers the packets over a channel model, and the protocol stack model describes a routing protocol for the MANET. Examples of reactive MANET routing protocols include ad hoc on demand distance vector (AODV), dynamic source routing (DSR), and destination sequenced distance vector (DSDV). Among them, in this study, we used the DSDV protocol due to its suitability for the military network systems [51] , [52] . Finally, The application model expresses behaviors of the node [50] .
Specifically, the application model provides several application program interfaces (APIs) for mobility and traffic, and a modeler uses them to describe network configuration [53] , [54] . Because the CGF model in our study provides these two factors, the application model needs to be modified. First, we extended the application model to receive mobility and traffic from the CGF model. Next, the ns-3 simulator does not support the HLA-compliant function; thus, we also modified the application model to participate in the HLA-based interoperable simulation.
D. MODEL INTEROPERATION WITH CGF AND NETWORK SIMULATORS
For sharing information between the two simulators, we designed a federation object model, as shown in Figure 9 . It contains one object for the nodes' positions and one interaction for the traffic between them. The object, i.e., NodeMobililty in Figure 9 , has two attributes for the corresponding node: NodePosition to update the position of the node and NodeID for its assigned ID. In the interaction, i.e., MessageTraffic, three parameters were defined: SoruceNodeID and DestinationNodeID to assign IDs of the both-sided nodes, and MessageID for an individual ID of the message. It is noted that MessageTraffic does not cover the detailed contents of the message. The object and interaction are transferred between the two simulators with proper APIs in RTI. Specific APIs for this study are as follows. First, we used two sets of patterns to publish and subscribe: sendInteraction and receiveInteraction for the interaction and updateAttributeValues and reflect AttributeValues for the object. nextEventRequest, which is an event-driven pattern, is utilized for discrete event simulation; and timeAdvanceGrant is used to indicate the completion of the event request.
The Roman numerals in Figure 9 represent the five steps through which the simulators interacted with each other. In the first and second steps, as a source, CPS A sends a C2 order to the network simulator via the CA model. In the third step, the network model computes communication traffic from node A to node B , which influences the model's outputs, e.g., end-to-end delay or packet delivery ratio. After that, the network simulator sends the C2 order to the receiving side, i.e., CPS B , via the CA model. All the steps excluding the third one can be achieved from HLA/RTI.
V. APPLICATION
This section presents a practical application of networked CPSs using the proposed M&S development. In the following subsections, we describe the simulation scenario, experimental design, model-based analysis, and discussion.
A. SIMULATION SCENARIO
The application focuses on network-centric ground warfare. Figure 10 simplifies a simulation scenario including blue (friendly) and red (hostile) CPSs. Arrows represent their expected paths and interacted communications during the warfare. The blue forces include a total of 131 military entities: specifically, 108 infantry-squad CUs, 12 platoon-level C2s, four company-level C2s, one battalion-level C2, and six mortar CUs. Infantry-squad CUs are designed as unit-level modeling to aggregate soldiers into a squad. Except for the 108 squads, all the entities are modeled as individual objects. In this scenario, the red forces are three times larger than the blue forces.
The blue CPSs carry out close and standoff attacks against approaching enemies. When the red CPSs approach the detected range of the friendly one, the blue CUs on the front line detect them and report the threat information to the C2 Platoon . The report is hierarchically conveyed from the C2 Platoon to the C2 Battalion [55] . After the C2 Battalion receives the report, it conducts a threat evaluation and weapon assignment (TEWA) process and commands the appropriate attacks, e.g., close combats or mortar attacks. The CU Close_combat or the CU Mortar_attack that receives the C2 order attacks the enemies.
The significant communications between the CUs and the C2s are expressed as blue arrows in Figure 10 . The communications within the network may influence the mission success of the blue forces. For instance, indirect and direct attacks from the CU Mortar_attack and the CU Close_combat will be smooth if the communications are perfect without packet delay and data loss.
Based on the model configuration explained in Figure 5 , we built hundreds of DEVS models, which is shown in Table 2 . The friendly forces for this application contain 246 coupled and 246 atomic models. The number of CPS coupled models is equal to the number of friendly combat entities. All the DEVS models except for the CGF and CA models were reused with two different levels. First, behavior and stages of atomic models were reused to develop new models that are slightly different from the old ones. Next, a model itself was also composed to construct higher composite models [11] . These scalability, composability, and reusability are the main advantages of DEVS modeling [47] .
From a military M&S view, an abstract level of CGF simulation would be above the mission level, and that of the network simulation would be the engineering level [11] . Because the scenario has been used for our previous studies [56] - [58] , we assume that it was already validated. Table 3 shows the primary input parameters of the two developed simulators. The CGF simulator has three computational parameters regarding decision-making and one physical parameter for weapon capability. The decision-making parameters are times related to C2, and the physical parameter is an engineering performance of a lethal radius of indirect weapons. We modeled 60-mm mortar systems for indirect weapons [59] . The lethal radius as the physical parameter is the bursting area the mortar bomb throws fragments in an irregular pattern so that the enemies are damaged. In this study, the lethal radius for the 60-mm mortar systems varies 20 to 30 meters [60] .
B. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The network simulator contains parameters for specifications of communication equipment. We first determined the main uncontrollable parameters of the ns-3 simulator as follows: the periodic time interval between exchange of full routing tables among nodes (PeriodicUpdateInterval) = 100 seconds, the minimum time an update is to be stored in a table (SettlingTime) = 5 seconds, the maximum number of packets that we allow a routing protocol to buffer (MaxQueueLen) = 500, the maximum number of packets that we allow a destination to buffer (MaxQueuedPacketsPerDst) = 5, and the maximum time packets can be queued (MaxQueueTime) = 30 seconds. For controllable parameters, we identified five ones of Table 3 affecting the simulation results after consulting with network system experts.
Because simulation models are characterized statistically, not deterministically, repeated simulation runs at the same experimental point allow for mitigation of the effects of statistical and random noise in experimental outputs. Nonetheless, there are no definitive guidelines for selecting the appropriate number of replications for Monte-Carlo simulation [61] . One simulation in this application lasted approximately 1.18 hours, which may be a little different depending on experiment points. Due to the constraint of such a timeconsuming problem, we need to choose the lower bound for the replications to ensure the output accuracy statistically. Consequently, we repeated 30 times every experimental point, which is generally derived from the probabilistic model based on the central limit theorem. This number of repetitions has been widely used for Monte-Carlo simulation that should consider simulation cost and accuracy in a balanced way [62] . Table 4 indicates the measurement indices for evaluating mission success and network performance. In the military analysis, the former is relevant to the measure of effectiveness (MoE) to accomplish mission objectives, and the latter corresponds to the measure of performance (MoP) that represents system-particular quantifiable features. This application evaluates two MoEs for the CGF simulator and two MoPs for the network simulator [63] .
Finally, the development environment for this application is as follows: DEVSim++ (ver. 3.1), ns-3 (ver. 3.18), and RTI 1.3-NG were used for the CGF simulator, the network simulator, and their interoperation, respectively. All the software was executed in desktops with I5-3550 3.3 GHz CPU and 8 GB RAM.
C. MODEL-BASED ANALYSIS: COMPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS
The ideal experimentation for simulation analysis is to use all design spaces. In our case, the total experimental points are
These numerous experiments via interoperable simulation cause a time-consuming problem due to the computational complexity of the simulators and the overhead of interoperation middleware [56] .
To overcome this weakness, we carried out two statistical analyses from macroscopic and microscopic views. The macro-analysis analyzes simulation results by changing all the parameters of the two simulators. For example, it facilitates the CGF simulator to compute its outputs via dynamical interaction with the network simulator. On the other hand, the micro-analysis concentrates on interesting points of one simulator by fixing the parameters of the other simulator. Thus, the macro-analysis is more effective when an analyst needs to know the general tendencies between the inputs and outputs of the two simulators at the beginning of the experiments. Afterward, he or she focuses on specific experimental points of one simulator to keep the influences of the other simulator constant. These two-stage analyses are the best way to carry out the complementary analysis proposed in this study.
1) EXPERIMENT 1: MACRO-ANALYSIS
Of the entire design spaces in Table 2 , we selected a total of 257 experimental points for the macro-analysis: 147 points using face-centered central composite (FCC), 55 points using Latin hypercube (LH) design, and 55 random points.
As a representative simulation result, Figure 11 shows the change of the enemy-survivability rate according to the two different communication situations. The blue-line group indicates the simulation results with the poor network environment, i.e., P PS = 100, P TP = −10, P TG = 0, P RG = 20, and P PM = 1. On the contrary, the red-line group shows the results based on a better network environment, i.e., P PS = 100, P TP = 40, P TG = 20, P RG = 20, and P PM = 1. Each group has multiple light lines for repeated simulations and one clear line for an average of the repetitions. Therefore, the gaps between the light line and the clear one mean statistical and random noise.
The two groups similarly show a tendency to decrease the enemy-survivability rate over simulation time. In particular, the red group shows a more rapid decrease than the blue one, which means that better communication brings more mission success. This trend is especially true at the early stage of the simulation when the indirect attacks are carried out.
In order to interpret the sensitivity and robustness of the simulation results, we built first-order linear regression models. Tables 5 and 6 show the models of Experiment 1 y ∼ 1+P CR +P IF +P TE +P WA +P PS +P TP +P TG +P RG +P PM . We measured the standardized errors of the estimates (SE), t-statistic values of hypothesis tests for the corresponding coefficients (t Stat ), and significant probabilities (p-value) [64] , [65] . The SE is relevant to the estimation noise, and the t Stat (=coeff./SE) means the actual signal against the noise. When a parameter has a p-value less than 0.05, it can be significant for a confidence interval of 95%.
In Table 5 , because the p-values of all parameters except P IF , P TE , and P WA are less than 0.05, they are statistically significant for the outputs of the CGF simulator. Note that P IF , P TE , and P WA seem to have little effects, although they are the parameters of the CGF simulator. The parameters with higher coefficients have more significant influences on the outputs than the parameters with lower values. In this regard, P CR has the most significant impact on mission effectiveness.
The results of Table 6 are slightly different from those of Table 5 . Only three parameters, i.e., P PS , P TP , and P PM , are statistically significant for the end-to-end delay; on the other hand, all the parameters of the network simulator along with P CR are statistically significant for the packet delivery ratio. Similar to with the original data, which makes it necessary to conduct microscopic analyses.
2) EXPERIMENT 2: MICRO-ANALYSIS FROM CGF SIMULATOR SIDE
As explained in Section V.C, the micro-analysis of one simulator is based on the fixed input parameters of the other simulator. Note that fixing the parameters does not mean that the opposite simulator generates constant outputs all the time. For example, although x N of the network simulator in Figure 1 is fixed, v N and y N can be changeable according to the received v CGF . In this study, for the micro-analysis, we fixed the parameters when the opposite simulator generates ideal outputs.
In Experiment 2, the ideal point of the network simulator is where it generates a high packet delivery ratio and a low end-to-end delay. As shown in Figure 12 , the cross marks in two graphs indicate the overall 257 points depending on the two outputs of the network simulator. Among them, we found a pair of marks to satisfy the above conditions, which are indicated in red. This experimental point has P PS = 800, P TP = 10, P TG = 15, P RG = 15, and P PM = 1.
Although the parameters of the network simulator are fixed, the full design space from the CGF simulator side is 11 (P CR ) × 11 (P IF ) × 11 (P TE ) × 11 (P WA ) = 14, 641. This still requires a long execution time, with approximately 518,000 hours when 30 repetitions per each point are conducted (1.18 hours per one execution). For this reason, we selected 51 experimental points from the entire spaces: 25 points using the FCC design, 9 points using the LH design, and 17 random points. Table 7 shows first-order linear regression models for Experiment 2(y ∼ 1 + P CR + P IF + P TE + P WA ) . First, through the p-values, all the parameters are statistically significant. Next, the signs of coefficients inform whether they are directly or inversely proportional to the outputs. Because the two outputs of the CGF simulator have completely conflicting trends, the coefficient of one parameter has different signs according to the outputs. In addition, P CR has a larger coefficient than P IF , P TE , and P WA , which means that the physical parameter is more affected than the computational parameters in this experiment. Finally, the adj. R 2 values are high enough to judge that the model fully matches the original data. This is a clear difference from the macro-analysis.
3) EXPERIMENT 3: MICRO-ANALYSIS FROM NETWORK SIMULATOR SIDE
In Experiment 3, the micro-analysis from the network simulator side was performed. Two graphs in Figure 13 show all 257 experimental points according to the two outputs of the CGF simulator, i.e., the enemy-survivability rate and the loss-exchange ratio. The ideal point in view of the CGF simulator is the one with not only a low enemy-survivability rate but also a high loss-exchange ratio. A pair of red marks in Figure 13 are the ideal point, which has P CR = 30, P IF = 20, P TE = 20, P WA = 20. Similar to Experiment 2, the full design space from the network simulator side requires about 2,073, 000 hours, which is estimated from 30 repeated simulations for 58,564 points and 1.18 hours per 1 simulation. Thus, we selected 87 experimental points from the entire design space: 43 points using the FCC, 22 points using the LH design, and 22 random points. Table 8 shows the first-order regression models for Experiment 3(y ∼ 1 + P PS + P TP + P TG + P RG ) . As shown in the upper table, P TG and P RG have little effects on end-to-end delay. And the adj. R 2 value is 0.39, which does not guarantee that the regression model will match the original data. On the other hand, in the table below, all the network parameters influence the packet delivery ratio. This tendency is similar to the result of the macro-analysis. Next, in comparison to Table 6 , the adj. R 2 values are higher, which guarantees that the microanalysis is reliable enough to complement the results of the macro-analysis. 
D. DISCUSSION
We discuss the statistical tendencies between the inputs and outputs of the CGF and the network simulators within the interoperable simulation. Experiment 1 macroscopically shows how the outputs of one simulator were influenced by the inputs or parameters of the other simulator. In the case of the CGF simulator, all communication parameters of the network simulator, i.e., P PS , P TP , P TG , P RG , and P PM , had effects on both outputs of the CGF simulator. As shown in Figure 11 , during the poor communications between friendly CPSs, the enemy-survival rate was unchanged at the beginning of the simulation and slightly decreased after 2,000 seconds. It implies that high-performance CPSs cannot always carry out successive missions according to network conditions. Next, in the case of the network simulator, the computational parameters, i.e., P IF , P TE , and P WA , have little effects on both outputs of the network simulator. On the contrary, the physical parameter, P CR , about weapon performance is affected by the output of the network simulator. The interesting point is that P CR has considerable influence on the packet delivery ratio in common with the communication parameters. Thus, in order to analyze network performance, it is important to consider network configuration and the simulation scenario. It is the main reason why model interoperation and complementary analysis are necessary.
In Experiments 2 and 3, we analyzed the inputs and outputs of one simulator by keeping the other simulator ideal for the micro-analysis. Specifically, Experiment 2 shows that P CR has the most influence on the enemy-survivability rate and the loss-exchange ratio. In our experiments, physical factors more influence mission effectiveness than computational factors. In Experiment 3, although all the network parameters affect the packet delivery ratio, gain-related parameters, i.e., P TG and P RG , have little effects on the end-to-end delay compared to the other parameters.
The proposed M&S could be utilized for various whatif scenarios such as cyber attacks. For example, it can be used to simulate behaviors of CPSs under the network structure and analyze the proper alternatives for them to overcome the situation. To analyze various scenarios, we remain two additional techniques, i.e., simulation acceleration for reducing the overall simulation time and accurate statistical methods for describing the results. We have studied several modeling methods to reduce the simulation execution time by embracing a slight amount of error [57] , [58] . Although these techniques are outside the scope of this study, it is helpful to use them for various complementary analyses of networked CPSs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because communication technology is increasingly essential, networked CPSs have become a prerequisite. In this regard, NCW containing defense CPSs have been analyzed using M&S techniques; however, these studies suffer from shortcomings such as unified model development and localized simulation analysis.
This study proposed M&S development to address two issues, i.e., model-driven development via model interoperation and simulation analysis between interoperated models. We proposed modeling activities in a way that leads to the achievement of capabilities through an SoS approach rather than from just the performance of individual systems. As the main contribution, the proposed model and complementary analysis give rise to a practical insight that cannot be achieved with single-system simulation and single analysis.
In the case study, we analyzed the computational and physical capabilities of the CPSs as well as the communication effects between the CPSs with macroscopic and microscopic views. Specifically, we discussed several findings, i.e., balancing physical and computational abilities, the importance of information technology, and statistical trends between the inputs and outputs of the models. We hope this study provides better information and confidence to simulation experts and provides an interpretation to people who may not sufficiently comprehend the M&S results. 
